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ABSTRACT

The study of educational administration should continue its trend toward a qualitative interpretation of reality and abandon the positivistic, scientific approach of the last 25 years. Herbert Simon's work in 1945 set the field upon the path of accepting the assumptions of positivistic thought as the limits of scientific inquiry in administration, thereby obliterating values as an appropriate aspect. Simon's value-free approach appeared in 1957 in a form called the "New Movement," an ideology of scientific administration promulgated by Halpin and other theorists. The flaw was creation of a science that is powerless in the face of the conflicts and ethical dilemmas that suffuse curriculum and administration. If it is argued that science cannot comprehend values, then the study of administration must be conceived of, in the words of Hodgkinson, as a kind of humanism whose purpose is the civilization of power. A research agenda of the emerging science would question fundamental truths that motivate the actors of administration. Toulmin's (1938) observation that the progress of modern science and the transformation of the scientist from an observer of reality to a participant in its construction is now applicable to the attitudes of the administrative scientist. (CJH)

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Representing Organization Theory with a Human Face:

The Search for a Human and Humane Understanding of Administration

by

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Abstract

For more than a quarter of a century, promoters of science in administration have claimed they could make human decision-making rational, or more rational than it would be without the application of science to it. They claimed also to have at hand the means for increasing the effectiveness and efficiency of organizations by a value-free technology. The basis for these claims lay in the early work of Herbert Simon who set the field upon a path that led it to accept the assumptions of positivistic thought as the limits of scientific inquiry. Simon set out to understand "the logic and psychology of human choice". It is Simon's great achievement that he saw choice as vital to an adequate understanding of administration. Ultimately, however, Simon did more to develop a logic *for choice-making* than he did to describe how people actually make choices in the face of the uncertainties, complexities, and moral dilemmas of everyday life. The reason Simon failed is that his assumptions obliterated values as an appropriate--or possible--aspect of scientific inquiry in administration. Simon's appealing and apparently value-free study of administration was, however, carried over with great impetus into education. It appeared there in 1957 in a form called the "New Movement". This ideology of scientific administration was promulgated by Halpin and other theorists with support from professors of educational administration who were glad to wear the colours of science and from practitioners who were glad to know that science would take their side in the struggles that are part of the everyday world of administration. It is a strong and immediately appealing notion that makes us want to believe that administrative problems are solved by science not people, and, indeed, people have been generally content to accept this claim with little question. The flaw in New Movement ideology is that it has brought us a science that is powerless in the face of the conflicts and ethical dilemmas that suffuse curriculum and administration. Nevertheless the promoters of administrative science have largely accepted Simon's worldview, and so they have used his restricted conceptions of administration and of science as a necessary and appropriate framework for training administrators. Training programs cast within the assumptions of Simon's science attempt to harness the power of a value-free science. Instead, such programs are often better described as overlaying a patina of spurious science upon the assumptions and values of sovereign social and political systems. An adequate science of administration must include values. But if it is argued that science cannot comprehend values, then the study of administration must be conceived of, in the words of Hodgkinson, as a kind of humanism whose purpose is the civilization of power. This way of thinking about administration will introduce a science with values--or at least a study that recognizes the inevitability of certain imponderables in the relationship of the individual to the social group. A human and humane science of administration must have the capacity to consider will, self, choice, and conflict over values. It should illumine the existential realities of those who use power and of those who suffer its application. Following these assumptions will take the study of administration into the realms of the subjective. It will lead the field towards the qualitative and the interpretative--towards judgement and art--and away from a spuriously objective science.

The study of educational administration is cast in a narrow mould. Its appeal stems from a science of administration whose experts claim that an objective view of the social world enables them to conduct value-free inquiry. They claim to possess knowledge that enables them to control organizations and to improve them. But such large claims appear increasingly unsound, for the science that justifies them rests on methods and assumptions that dismiss the central realities of administration as irrelevant. Those realities are values in human action. If administrative science deals with them at all, it does so only in a weakened or spuriously objective form. For this reason, scholars in educational administration are now called to consider whether their way forward is still to be defined, as it has been for a generation or more, by a single path called "the way of science." The alternative path would seek to understand administrative realities within a broader conception of science--a conception recognizing that values bespeak the human condition and serve as springs to action both in everyday life and in administration. But values are subjective realities, and people bind them inextricably to the facts in their worlds. Thus, an adequate new science may no longer be content to split facts from values, and deal only with the facts.

Promoters of the science of administration claim to have found a rational basis for human decision-making and a value-free technology for increasing the effectiveness and efficiency of organizations. Within a critical perspective, I will examine the basis of those claims and their mobilization on behalf of what Halpin (1970) called the "New Movement" in educational administration. My aim is, first, to describe the intellectual and ideological development of this once revolutionary movement. Second, I will examine the consequences and offer a critique of the scientific approach to understanding the problems of administration. Third, I will suggest an alternative to New Movement science in educational administration. And finally, I will speak about the problems of administrative studies in education today and suggest how those who are concerned to improve such studies might approach them in the future.

The Rise of Science in Administration

Self-conscious science entered administrative studies through the work of Herbert Simon. Published in 1945, *Administrative Behavior*[1] constituted a wholly new approach to the understanding and study of administration. His thinking transformed the field. Simon offered a totally new conception of the nature of administration, and, more importantly, a new set of rules for inquiry into administrative realities. From that time forward, his vision, his *Weltanschauung* of the world of administration, has dominated the field.

What Simon offered was a method of value-free inquiry into decision-making and administrative rationality. This method severely limited what could be considered as "administration" or "administrative decision-making," but its great advantage was that it brought the force of science to

[1] I will refer to the 1957 edition and use the valuable perspective that Simon's "Introduction to the Second Edition" provides on his work. The year 1957 also marks the beginning of "New Movement" science in educational administration.

buttress any claims that might be made about the nature of administration or about the best means for improving organizations and life within them. Thus, the unfortunate consequence of Simon's work has been to shift attention from questions about the nature of administration to an obsessive concern for the methods of inquiry into it.

Simon's critique of older knowledge in administration was that it offered little more than practitioners' prescriptive judgements on their experience. Simon's vision called for a knowledge of administrative realities founded on and validated by the power, objectivity, and utility of science. This transformation in administrative thought is perhaps worthy of being called a "Revolution", for it stands for the belief that only the methods of science can yield reliable insights into the realities of administration.

With the publication of Simon's seminal work in 1945, the methods of positivistic science were established as the only ones by which scholars might gain reliable knowledge of administrative realities. Following this bias, scholars of contemporary thought in administration, like March (1965, x-xii), have classified as "old" any knowledge created before 1950. This presentist bias stems from the ahistorical outlook of positivism and is seen in March's designation of his own and Simon's work as "adult" and "most fashionable". But for March and other advocates of the science of administration, what most powerfully distinguishes old knowledge from new--and useless knowledge from useful--is that new and reliable knowledge can stand only on a foundation of empirical science.

Simon's achievement was to overthrow the past wisdom of the field--a wisdom that derived from the experience, observation, and reflection of writers who were administrators, not scientists. The practitioner-scholars, such as Taylor, Urwick, and Fayol, regarded their knowledge as scientific. But their wisdom was expressed as "principles", and the truth of what they claimed rested more upon insight and assertion than upon science. Noting that the principles of administration occurred only in pairs, Simon (1957, 20) damned them as nothing more than mutually contradictory proverbs. Such knowledge suffered, he said, (1957, 38) from "superficiality, oversimplification, lack of realism". To correct these errors, Simon set out to build a theory of administration on scientific knowledge, and his lasting contribution was to convince both scholars and practitioners that he had realized his vision. What is striking is how easily he appeared to have won the battle.

The work of Chester Barnard (1938), another of the scholar-practitioners, stands in dramatic contrast to Simon's. Barnard was essentially a moralist, and for him the heart of administration lay in the leader's creation of cooperative effort and commitment to institutional purpose among members of an organization. Yet Barnard was apparently dazzled by Simon's claim to have science on his side. He wrote a preface to *Administrative Behavior* in which he acknowledged Simon's "important contribution" as "a set of tools ... suitable for describing an organization and the way an administrative organization works" (Simon, 1957, xli). But he also expressed confidence that these tools would simply confirm his belief in the abstract "principles of general organization" and the importance of experience, (such as his own) in understanding administration. In fact, Simon's science undermined

the interpretation of experience as a means for understanding organizations, and it deflected attention from the moral questions about purpose and commitment highlighted by Barnard.

Unlike the scholar-practitioners, Simon did not attempt to provide a prescription for administrative action. Instead, he made minimal assumptions about the nature of administration and narrowed the limits of inquiry. Simon set out to build a "vocabulary of administrative theory", a vocabulary that would say nothing that could not be expressed in "operational definitions" (1957, xlvi, 37). Such theory and its vocabulary would then be open to validation according to the norms of truth recognized by positivistic science. Simon's starting point for a scientific theory of administration was a single proposition: "Decision-making is the heart of administration." From this vantage point, he set out to explore "the logic and psychology of human choice" (1957, xlvi). The flaw in this definition is not so much its narrowness, for choice is certainly a fundamental and unavoidable dynamic in the making of organizational and administrative realities. Rather, the weakness stems from Simon's own choice to explore only the *factual basis of choice* and to ignore value and sentiment as springs of human action. Because science could not speak to the "ethical content" of decisions, Simon eliminated values from his putative science of administration. Thereafter he was content with his struggle to predict and control decisions purely from their "factual content":

> The question of whether decisions can be correct and incorrect resolves itself, then, into the question of whether ethical terms like "ought," "good," and "preferable" have a purely empirical meaning. It is a fundamental premise of this study that ethical terms are not completely reducible to factual terms.... Factual propositions cannot be derived from ethical ones by any process of reasoning, nor can ethical propositions be compared directly with the facts--since they assert "oughts" rather than the facts.... Since decisions involve valuations of this kind, they too cannot be objectively described as correct or incorrect (Simon, 1957, 38).

Simon's great contribution was his recognition that making decisions is the essence of administration. In a way not found in previous studies, he saw that decisions are taken by human beings, not by boxes drawn on an organization chart. He knew that "principles" founded on such abstractions would be impotent.

> To many persons, organization means something that is drawn on charts or recorded in elaborate manuals of job descriptions, to be duly noted and filed. Even when it is discussed by some of its most perceptive students--for example, Colonel Urwick--it takes on more the aspect of a series of orderly cubicles contrived according to an abstract architectural logic, than of a house designed to be inhabited by human beings (Simon, 1957, xvi.).

Simon's great failure was his own decision to focus exclusively on the factual basis of decisions and to regard as irrelevant all the other forces that shaped them, but which his science could not predict or control. And so the science of administration defined by Simon retreated in the face of the intractable powers and imponderable choices that make up the realities of life.

Simon and Positivism in Administrative Science

Since positivism dominates Simon's conception of science, it seems fair to use "science" in this discussion to mean positivistic inquiry. As Phillips (1983), Eisener (1983), and Culbertson (1983)

suggest, positivism is both a philosophy of empiricism and a set of rules for determining what constitutes truth. The force of the assumptions of this method of inquiry dispenses with any knowledge not based upon objective and empirical observation. Such inquiry must therefore deny the world of value. It must abjure as proper subjects for scientific study all of what Halpin (1958, xii) called "social philosophy" and all questions pertaining to "right human conduct". The positivist argument is, however, a powerful one. It reduces all internal states, all perceptions, feelings, and values to epiphenomena, to an unspeakable affect, to an externality that, as Hodgkinson (1983, 43) points out, "one can only rebut ... by referring to one's own phenomenological and, therefore, unverifiable experience... and by taking a position outside the limits of positivist discourse."

There is, of course, a broader conception of science in which the scientist is not only an observer but also an interpreter of reality. This view acknowledges that human interest and its possible biases are inextricably interwoven in what we call scientific truth (Bauman, 1978; Giddens, 1976; Rabinow & Sullivan, 1979; Toulmin, 1983). Such broader conceptions of science should, I believe, be accommodated within the study of educational administration, and, indeed, they are beginning to be expressed there--at least by the minority voices in the field who are advocates of alternative approaches. Fortunately these can now be found in the increasingly comprehensive and powerful statements of scholars such as Hodgkinson (1978b; 1983), Bates (1983; 1985), Foster (1984), Gronn (1983; 1985; 1986), and Lakomski (1984; 1985).

Simon's conception of administration as decision-making and his dedication to the belief that the methods of positivistic science could be used to understand and improve the rationality of administrators' decisions have powerfully shaped the modern field of study. From these theoretical points of departure, he constructed a model of rationality--the limited, sufficing rationality of "administrative man" who makes only decisions that are "good enough". Simon's administrative man "satisficed", as opposed to omniscient "economic man" who maximized and made the best possible decisions. Simon's view of administration thus retained the assumptions of the economic model, but modified them to accommodate a less than perfect rationality. What is perhaps not so readily apparent is that he also retained the assumptions so dear to systems theorists--that administration is a function in a productive system and that this function is open to manipulation in the same way as other independent and objective conditions. For Simon, administration was simply an element or function in a productive system; as such, it could be regarded as operating in precisely the same manner as all other technical variables of a productive system.

The Failure of Administrative Science

My aim here is not so much to demonstrate the failure of administrative science in education, for I have been over that ground many times--too many times--before (Greenfield, 1975, 1978, 1980; 1985a; 1985b). Over the last decade or more, the continuing "turmoil" in the field has been well chronicled elsewhere (Griffiths, 1979). And the implications of the furor have been drawn so fully and so clearly that only the obtuse or the uninformed could claim to be unaware of them (Gronn, 1983; 1985a). I have

argued that administrative science has failed in education, but I believe its failure is equally apparent in the other sub-fields of administration as well. The difference in the sub-fields is perhaps best seen in the contrast between the journals, *Administrative Science Quarterly* and *Educational Administration Quarterly*. The former recognizes the Revolution may be in trouble, and its articles reflect a radically expanded view of administrative theory and empirical inquiry; the latter denies, or seems to, that there are any problems in the unfolding of the Revolution.[2] The predominating opinion in that journal continues to recommend more and larger doses of science largely in the form of improved methodologies, but still within the restrictive notions of theory and method that have pervaded the field since Simon blazed the revolutionary path.

The revolutionary goals that Modern Organization Theory promised generally for administration were echoed in Halpin's New Movement in educational administration (Greenfield, 1985b). Although the ideology of these movements still reigns supreme as a kind of Doctrine of the Revolution of Science in Administration, this Revolution, in my view, has failed; it has been unable to answer why the science that Simon stipulated to solve administrative problems has notably failed to do so.

Mainstream thought in educational administration stands, though perhaps now with weakened conviction, on Simon's restrictive definition of administrative realities, embracing, a fortiori, his view of appropriate inquiry. For the most part, modern administrative theorists have heeded Simon's argument that the science of administration can be concerned only with means, not ends. The spirit of positivism, which is now pervasive, discourages historical inquiry, and so puts to flight any notion that scholars of administration should know their intellectual origins and the assumptions on which their field rests. But placed in the history of ideas, the belief that administration is (or can be) a science appears as a phenomenon of the mid-20th century. As we near the end of the century, this belief is beginning to appear as a misplaced faith. It is also becoming clear why it is an enormous error to conceive of administration as a science rather than as a moral act or as a political event.

Because positivistic science cannot derive a value from a fact or even recognize values as real, we have a science of administration which can deal only with facts and which does so by eliminating from its consideration all human passion, weakness, strength, conviction, hope, will, pity, frailty, altruism, courage, vice, and virtue. Simon led the science of administration down a narrow road which in its own impotence is inward-looking, self-deluding, self-defeating, and unnecessarily boring. These shortcomings are created by the blinkered view of choice and administrative action afforded by a narrowly empiricist science which lets us see but a pale and reduced reflection of the human will to achieve a purpose, to mobilize resources, to influence others--to do all that people in fact do as they make choices and strive to transform their values into realities.

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[2]Perhaps seeing language itself as the problem, the editors of *EAQ* recently announced a prohibition on first person pronouns. Ironically they chose to begin their battle against the subjectivism of the world in a text dealing with *ethnographic intent*. So they extirpated "I", "me", and "my" from Wolcott (1985) whose text thereby suffered a sea-change.

The current overwhelming acceptance of positivistic science in administration has led theory and research to emphasize the epiphenomena of reality rather than the phenomenological force of that reality itself. This approach yields "hard", but often impotent, irrelevant, or misleading data that are the only reality recognized by the hypothetico-deductive models favoured in such science. In this science, only that which is quantifiable and calculable is real, for that is the only kind of reality consistent with the limited rationality that finds its ultimate expression in the linear workings of computers. What is lost in such approaches is human intention, value, commitment--human passion and potential. What is lost is human will and choice, the sheer power of people pursuing their purposes, a pursuit that brings what some may call good and others evil. Hodgkinson (1978b, 18) has shown, moreover, that administrative science has led us to focus upon the personality traits of administrators-- upon the mere characteristics of administrators rather than upon their character. In consequence, the empirical study of administrators has elided their *moral* dimensions and virtually all that lends significance to what they do.

If this selective focusing is noticed in contemporary critiques of research, it appears only in Haller and Knapp's (1985) terms. Their response to the futility of research on the superficial characteristics of administrators is not to look more deeply, but to remove entirely the individual as a focus in administrative research. For them, a focus on the individual confuses "the *questions* that are studied with the *subjects* ... of the studies." They recommend examining only the organizational production functions that administrators oversee. This position highlights the ultimate concern of administrative science--the effectiveness and efficiency of the organization which is, of course, conceived as an entity independent of human will, purpose, and values.

What Simon Omitted: Right, Responsibility, Reflection

Simon's aim and hope were sweeping and daring: to enhance organizational efficiency and effectiveness by ensuring that administrators chose--within the limits of the rationality open to them--the best possible means to achieve a given end. But to fulfill the promise of the new science of productive rationality, administrative man had to disappear as a value-bearer and willful and unpredictable choice-maker. Thus Simon's administrative man emerged in a devalued, dehumanized, and technologized form.

> Once the system of values which is to govern an administrative choice has been specified, there is one and only one "best" decision, and this decision is determined by the organizational values and situation, and not by the personal motives of the member of the organization who makes the decision. Within the area of discretion, once an individual has decided, on the basis of his personal motives to recognize the organizational objectives, his further behavior is determined not by personal motives, but by the demands of efficiency (Simon, 1957, 204).

So, if this view defines the limits of a science of administrative decision-making, it must be noted that some vital questions of administration lie beyond them. All that governs the choice of the values for the system are beyond it, as is the question of what objective reality could exist to keep the personal

motives, character, or ideology of individual members from impinging upon the choices they make in pursuing the values of the organization.

The horror of Simon's neutered science appears only with the realization that it conforms, almost perfectly, to the view that administrators seem to want to have of themselves: that they are instruments of an objective, selfless, rationality. Administrative science, as Simon conceived it, has done much to establish the belief that de-valued, but rational decision-making is desirable, attainable, and scientifically verifiable. This belief relieves the anxiety of decision-making and removes the administrator's sense of responsibility for his decisions. Scott and Hart (1979, 46-47) show how a de-valued rationality can help administrators deal with practical problems, but only at the price of desensitizing them to the values that must be engaged in making a difficult decision:

> The management of organizations is a practical and mundane effort. Implicit within the pragmatic rule is a warning against philosophizing.... Organizations are run by managers who must make decisions about goals, policies, and strategies of action that influence human values and behaviour, both within and outside the organization.... The vice president for personnel of a large company that must lay off five hundred employees is certainly not encouraged to consider the impact of this action on their lives. Instead, consideration is given to the health of the company.

A commitment to science in organizational affairs is not simply a commitment to rationality; it is, rather, a commitment to a restricted framework of rationality. Such a framework, called science, eases the sense of responsibility for powerful actors in organizational and administrative settings. It denies both responsibility and personal choice in the making of everyday decisions and in the making of decisions in the powerful world of organized reality. Such science takes sides in conflicts about the rightness of organizational purpose and about appropriate means for achieving them, but it denies it takes sides, and claims to look dispassionately at such reality. As Hodgkinson (1978b, 163) says, "Obedience or compliance can be construed as a way of abdicating responsibility." In our society with its reverence for science and technique, obedience to a truncated concept of rationality has become a cover for the powerful administrator: science and rationality provide the ultimately persuasive and irrefutable excuse for the abdication of personal choice and responsibility.

To choose and to acknowledge responsibility for one's choice is often a risky way of living. It may require standing with those who are defined as heretics by a powerful and possibly vengeful authority. The safe course for administrators is suggested by Szasz's rueful observation:

> The Platonic maxim that "It is better to suffer wrong than to commit it" is fine for those to whom life is a spectator sport; the players, however, need something that gives them a little more protection in the clinches (Szasz, 1976, 33).

The moral dilemma of the administrator whose best judgement leads him to stand on the wrong side of authority was noted nearly fifteen centuries ago by Boethius, "the last of the Romans". A scholar turned administrator, he tried to serve both the emperor and--as it turned out--the wrong pope. His reward for acting according to conscience was death at the hands of his master, Theodoric the Ostrogoth. The emperor, however, first placed Boethius under house arrest and thereby gave him time

to reflect on his actions and to write *The Consolation of Philosophy*. There he makes the case that philosophy is the *only* consolation for a miscalculated risk. In his meditation, the figure of Philosophy appears to Boethius (1969, 53) and points out the high price of choosing to serve truth rather than sovereign power.

> If you desire
> To look on truth
> And follow the path
> With unswerving course
> Rid yourself
> Of joy and fear,
> Put hope to flight,
> And banish grief.
> The mind is clouded
> And bound in chains
> Where these hold sway.

In organizational politics and administrative affairs, the acknowledgement of clearly chosen values can be dangerous. But as Boethius's life makes clear, acknowledgement enables us--both leaders and followers--to reflect upon our values. And in thinking about our lives, we may come to recognize that our decisions represent something beyond the decisions themselves; they bespeak a value and perhaps a commitment. As Hodgkinson (1978b, 172) points out, such commitment:

> is, of course, subject to critique from other philosophical positions, but all that the proponents of these contending positions can do is to seek to persuade their audience by reason and rhetoric and all the powers at their disposal that they have the better values. In the end the act of choice is individual; and if free and conscious, then moral.

The Infusion of Science into Educational Administration

Science emerged in public administration in 1945 with Simon's work and has dominated all parts of the field since then. The spirit of positivism spread to educational administration in the 1950s in a form Halpin (1970) called the "New Movement". This revolution began with a small band of social scientists who set out to redeem the older studies through science (Halpin, 1958; Campbell and Lipham, 1960). Halpin (1970, 161) describes the shock of the scholar-practitioners when advocates of the new science-based administration confronted them with the news that their knowledge was "atheoretical and sloppy". He also reports that the reception the practitioners gave this news was "less than cordial". But, by 1957, the New Movement scientists were in command, and they announced to a seminar held at the Midwest Administration Center of the University of Chicago the arrival of the scientific millennium in educational administration.

From that point onwards there began a remarkably rapid transformation of the theory, research, and graduate instruction in educational administration. Deaf to critical voices who warned against the founding of inquiry on a flawed and narrow foundation, scientists of the New Movement did not waver in their conviction. They justified their new understanding of administration with the claim that it brought research into line with the requirements of science and of rationality itself (Culbertson 1983).

Seeing the strategic advantage of having Science on their side, practitioners soon began to endorse New Movement assumptions and ideology. Under the banner, "Administrative Theory as a Guide to Action," the Midwest Administration Center of the University of Chicago sponsored a second conference on theory, one that brought together social scientists and practitioners in the special mix that now marks so much of scholarly and professional endeavour in the field. Although Campbell warned the Conference that the millennium was not yet at hand, and though he cautioned that "scientific knowledge offers maps, not prescriptions", he also discouraged stragglers from the way by expressing the view that "social science is principally the description of an intelligent, rational person in action" (Campbell & Lipham, 1960, 175-176).

Halpin, however, was later torn by doubts concerning his role in promulgating a science that promised to enable the administrator to "make wiser decisions" (Halpin, 1966, 285). He acknowledged that the ringing title of the conference invited administrators to believe in theory as a guide for action, when in fact there was "no theory worthy of the name available to report" (Halpin, 1970, 157). But scholars and practitioners of the time were prepared to testify that the emperor called Science had clothes. Indeed, Marland, one of the superintendents at the 1959 conference (Campbell & Lipham, 1960, 34), told how practitioners awaited with interest the "science of administration" and how they "listen[ed] attentively to the counsel of social scientists".[3] Marland compares the science-supported administrator to the bush pilot who

> now finds himself in the pilot's chair of a monstrous flying machine of untold power and dimensions. The social scientist tells us that there are buttons to push, levers to adjust, gauges to watch, beacons to reckon, and codes to decipher. He tells us that one cannot fly this craft by the seat of the pants, but that certain buttons and levers, when actuated, produce specific and predictable results in the performance and the posture of the craft. (Campbell & Lipham, 1960, 24)

What has been called "modern organization theory" (Haire, 1959; March 1965) was created in close parallel with Halpin's "New Movement" in educational administration. Both may be seen as movements reflecting Simon's pioneering attempt to establish the study of organizations and administration on an objective scientific basis. Both began with a conscious break from previous studies that were viewed as mired in "social philosophy" (Halpin, 1958, xii). Both advocated that science, cast in an objective, positivistic mould, could save the field from the philosophers, moralists, and other subjectivists. Together they represented the deliberate founding of a new science of organizations which aimed to establish the experimental verification of "hypothetico-deductive theory"--an abstract, mathematically expressed theory that was held by its proponents to be the highest form of scientific knowledge. That there was no such theory of this kind in existence did not seem to deter advocates from seeking it, indeed, from launching research into organizations to test it. Such theory, it was held, would produce control over organizations in the same way that it permitted

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[3]The attitude of the time is seen in Marland's deferential reference to "scientist Halpin" (Campbell & Lipham, 1960, 34.)

control over the physical world. The aim of the New Movement in educational administration was to generate such theory about schools, to place it in the hands of administrators, and to train them in its use. And so began the effort to train educational administrators in the science of organizations.

Convinced by a similar logic, Haller and Knapp (1985, 161) have more recently urged researchers not to focus on administrators, but rather to study relationships within organizations. They define educational administration as "the study of the patterned relationships...with particular attention to the effects of those relationships on the transmission of subject matter to learners." The image of organizations assumed here is that of a productive unit staffed by human beings who are subsidiary to the unit and largely independent of it. In this conception, it is relation- ships and structures are important, not people themselves.

The scientific view of educational administration continues to recommend systems theory, a conception which sees the organization as a productive unit striving under conditions of limited rationality to increase its output to a constraining environment. This view also continues to see the failure of science-based theories of administration as remediable by better and more powerful methodology. Such opinion thus reflects Simon's empiricism and his hope for improving the effectiveness and efficiency of the organization through rational decision-making. In these circumstances, it is not surprising to find that discussion of the failure of science-based theory and research soon reduces to technical issues--skewed distributions, outliers, Tukey's test, and box and whisker plots.[4]

The Consequences of the New Science of Organizations

Despite the promise that the science of organization and administration was to be objective, quantitative, and value-free, the *images* of organization found in the theory-based research of the New Movement carry important values and philosophical assumptions. Taking these values and assumptions into consideration, four consequences of the movement should be noted.

The Growing Belief in Administration as Science

The New Movement gave social validation to the belief that an objective science for guiding organizations had indeed been invented. With this belief widely accepted, so too was the idea that administrators should be trained in the science through programs of study in universities. Oftentimes, these programs have been state-mandated and tied to certification. Such programs teach the science of organization to administrators in the conviction it will enable them to do what they are supposed to do: direct organizations to achieve their goals in the most effective and efficient manner open to them. In this connection, the dominating metaphors of the science of administration are worth noting. Belief in the rationality of decision-making is prime among them, though this notion is closely

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[4]Among the many who call for better technique to shore up the sagging science of administration, see Willower (1979; 1980), Hoy (1982), Fields (1985), and Haller & Knapp (1985). Implicitly they defend the assumptions Simon made about appropriate theory and methods, though they never invoke his name.

tied to the systems concept that the organization is "real" and exists in a natural balance with its environment. In the systems view, to study an organization scientifically means to study an aspect of natural reality--a reality that can be explored objectively and explained in the law-like, universal languages of mathematics and logic. Individuals disappear--and with them human agency, responsibility, and morality--and natural forces take over the conduct of human affairs. And so we have the language of abstraction--so common in the literature--that, for example, speaks of "accommodating the organization to the reality demands of the environment and transforming the external situation" (Boyd & Crowson, 1981, 331).

To establish this science, it was necessary, as Hodgkinson pointed out to commit the biological fallacy of endowing the organization with an ontological reality. The organization is conceived not only as real, but as more important than the people within it:

> and worse; the organization is not only reified, but deified. And the agent is not personally or morally responsible for the acts which are under the authority or *authorship* of the collectivity.... And outwardly benevolent organizations can become latent collective forces for evil. (Hodgkinson, 1978, 173.)

And so another anomaly of scientific administration becomes apparent. Its emphasis falls not upon the phenomenological reality of administrators--neither upon the realities of those who wield power nor upon the perceptions of those who suffer its consequences. Such science chooses to study a greater reality, one that lies beyond the awareness of individuals: the reality of the organization itself. Even if we can assume the reality of the organization, and even if we assume that knowledge of that reality is in some way useful, we must still ask why administrative science has failed to explore the second of Simon's concerns: "the logic and psychology of human choice". The answer, as Hodgkinson (1978a, 272) suggests is "perhaps for the basic and stupefyingly simple reason that the central questions of administration are not scientific at all. They are philosophical". Here Hodgkinson is using "science" to mean an objective, imperial Science that is presumed to live only within the limits that positivism has placed upon it: a limit that reduces values to epiphenomena and that precludes Science from speaking about values at all.[5] If such limits are accepted, then Science cannot presume to tell any of us that we should go to work to day, let alone what we should do when we get there. But there is another and larger sense of science that sees it simply as truth, as reliable knowledge, and not as a particular method for arriving at knowledge (Schumacher, 1977). But what knowledge is reliable? Perhaps in the end we must be content simply with knowledge that lets us get through the day, preferably happily (Greenfield, 1983).

The De-valuation of Administrative Studies

The scientific movement is closely connected to the notion that a value-free science of administration is not merely possible, but at hand. With the elimination of values, consideration of the conduct of

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[5] I use "Science" to denote the narrower, but imperial inquiry that claims objectivity and value-neutrality and that stands in contrast to the broader search for reliable knowledge that characterizes all inquiry (Schumacher, 1977).

organizations is reduced to technicalities. The substance of decisions is not important--only the manner of the making of them. As Bates (1983, 8) points out, this approach brings with it a separation of problems in administration from problems in education. It also brings, as Tipton (1985) argues, the isolation of theory in educational administration from other academic studies that bear powerfully on its professed concerns and interests. Many texts in the field bear the unimaginative title, *Educational Administration*,[6] and from this emphasis one would expect that they should address uniquely educational issues. Not so. Readers look in vain for any substantive educational discussion. They may be told how to lead, motivate, communicate, develop morale, and maintain the organization in dynamic equilibrium, but they will find no discussion of an issue that they must bring judgement. Radical and conservative critiques of school structure and curriculum, disputes over religion and language of instruction, the virtues of private versus public schools, class and cultural bias, unions, women, discipline, dress codes--of all these and the many other issues that beset education, there is no murmur of comment. Not even the major controversies about the meaning and reliability of administrative science are discussed in these texts.[7]

Hidden Values of Administrative Science

Despite its claim to objectivity, the science of administration is usually to be found on the side of the status quo. It starts from a standpoint of things as they are, and then asks why they are so. It does not question whether that which is ought to be. The argument here is not that conventional society or the status quo are necessarily wrong, but that positivist science cannot and *should not* attempt to validate social reality without revealing the weakness of its credentials for doing so. But despite its claims to neutrality, Science cannot seem to resist taking on the role of social validator, and, in fact, is often well paid for its neutered conscience. This criticism has been launched against positivist social science generally, but in administration it has particular potency, for the state is the ultimate organization; it has almost unrestricted power over the individual--even the power that can ask and get an individual's life. But if Science conceives the state (and all organizations of lesser puissance) as an objectified reality that is beyond question by the science of organization, then its students have no recourse but to serve their organizations with all the skill and devotion of which they are capable. In Hobbesian terms, the administrative scientist becomes a servant of the General Will--of the Sovereign. The General Will is, of course, to be interpreted by the Sovereign, not by the scientist whose role is limited to that of a technician skilled in applying a kind of physics of sociation--the impersonal and objective science of social organization and administration.[8]

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[6]For example, Hoy & Miskel (1982).

[7]In a text devoted wholly to theory in educational administration, Silver (1983) devotes not even a footnote to the controversies that have shaken educational administration for over a decade.

[8]These ideas are elaborated in Greenfield (1984, 147-151).

A science of administration limited by the assumptions of positivism can produce experts in technique, not experts in value. If, however, the positivists are right, and values are merely an illusion or an affect that registers only in the psyche of individuals, then no real problem exists, for there is no objective way of expressing or arbitrating between competing claims of perceived value. The physics of sociation would then suffice as a basis for understanding and evaluating social reality. But if values are real, and if they are beyond the scope of positivist science, then a science of social order that claims to be value-free must remain silent in the face of the central issues of organizational and administrative life. But remain silent it does not. The mantle of objectivity permits scientists to intervene on the behalf of values without seeming to do so, and to move readily from commenting on the way things are to advocating the way they should be. In the contemporary field, such scientists are everywhere: for example, administrators who, following Hoy and Miskel (1982, vii), want to make their practice "less of an art and more of a science," the agent of educational change and implementation, the consultant on organization development who promises to improve the "health" of the organization, and now the purveyors of excellence in organization and designs for effective schools. Indeed, all *experts* in organization theory who claim their prescriptions stand on objective Science are open to challenge, for their values, not their Science, constitute the real foundation of their knowledge.

The difficulty that arises from a belief in the possibility of a de-valued notion of rationality and decision-making is well illustrated with a metaphor from Hodgkinson: the sandwich of rationality. Closely following his explication of three levels of reality and three types of values, Hodgkinson (1983; 1985; 1986) draws attention to *levels* of reality and value in rationality itself. In this view, any human choice is made up of three elements. One is cognitive and limitedly rational in Simon's sense of the calculation of the factual relationship between ends and means. This calculation constitutes the "meat" of the sandwich, but it is held in place by two slices of bread made up of subrational affect on the one hand and another slice made up of superrational ideology and transrational value. The sandwich metaphor thus recognizes that human beings are driven by their desires and fears, by their hopes and ideals, as much as by their rational calculations. And who is to say that such drives are not also a kind of rationality?

Angels and other rationalists says it. For as William Blake said:

> I have always found that Angels have the vanity to speak of themselves as the only wise. This they do with a confident insolence sprouting from systematic reasoning.

This point urges not that we dispense with systematic reasoning, but only that we recognize it as compact with an individual's ideology, ideals, commitment, and preference. What the angels of systematic reasoning and administrative science must comprehend is that issues great and small--whether to die for love of one's country, whether to close a school in the face of falling enrolments, whether to stop smoking today--are decided by people who bring all their belief, passion, habit, frailty, or nobility to the choice that faces them. Whatever the choice before them, they are unlikely to make it on the basis of a calculated, fact-driven rationality alone. Or as I have argued, facts *are*, but they do

not tell us what to do (Greenfield, 1980, 43). Indeed, the facts alone decide nothing; it is we who decide about the facts. This realization comes as no surprise to historians and artists who deal with what men and women do, not with what the "angels of reason" (see Huxley, 1960) would have them do. But scientists of administration continue to be surprised, and spend much effort pointing out how the world would be better if people only behaved "rationally". This then is the failure of administrative science. Instead of providing, as it claims, an objective description of the world and of human choice, administrative science offers merely another value-driven prescription. Apparently despairing over the irrationality of the world, many otherwise encouraging critiques of administrative science offer expressions of hope that stronger research methodologies will yet plumb the depths of its mystery and find Simon's fact-only rationality at the bottom (see Haller & Knapp, 1985; Hoy, 1982).

Science-Validated Training Programs

New Movement science fosters and legitimates programs for training and certifying administrators. During the 1950s, a foundation-supported drive began in the United States to transform the old-style training programs into new ones based upon the assumptions of modern organization theory and administrative science (Tope, et al., 1965). These programs were designed to bring New Movement administrative science to bear upon the practical problems of education. Such programs have since spread through the proselytizing efforts of university-based advocates to other countries, notably the English-speaking Commonwealth countries, but increasingly to Third World countries as well.[9] To criticize the spread of such programs is not to suggest that the training of administrators is futile and unnecessary; rather, it is to argue that many university-based training, captured by a narrowly defined concept of administration, restrict the possibility of productive inquiry into administration.

Sovereign powers, in the form of state departments of education and other public and private authorities have long had a role in the choice and validation of administrators for educational institutions. As Gronn (1985b) has shown, the selection of administrators is driven by a rationality that sweeps far beyond the logic of fact-driven choice. How could it be otherwise? Administrators are essentially value-carriers in organizations; they are both arbiters of values and representatives of them. Those who select and evaluate administrators are not so naive as to ignore their surface characteristics. Indeed, they likely see all that meets the senses--dress, speech, custom--as expressions of the administrator's deeper values and commitments. But administrative science, holding up the ideal of the administrator as technician, is likely to argue otherwise. It offers the Sovereign the possibility of choosing the "certified" decision-maker, the one who uses science to bring excellence, effectiveness, or efficiency--as though these conditions had no value content--to whatever organization employs him.

And so administrative science again plays into the hand of the social system. While the scientifically-based training program claims to produce technicians skilled in decision-making and

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[9]For further critique of this advocacy, see Riffel (1986) and Greenfield (1975; 1979/80)

organization building, the Sovereign looks beyond such froth to the prospective administrator's values and character. But the froth is not irrelevant either; if for no other reason, it is politically advantageous to be seen standing with Science. Therefore we see authorities increasingly turning to science-driven training programs. The result is a happy one for both sides of the bargain. The Sovereign can claim a scientific validation of its decisions, and Science gets privileged access to the benefits the Sovereign can bestow.

Callahan (1964) has identified four stages in the historical development of administrative programs for American school superintendents, and he shows how each stage was shaped by a characteristic ideal. In this development, we may also see the values that now generally pervade programs for the training of educational administrators in the United States. And--thanks to the international network that promulgates science-based training in educational administration--we may see these same values in similar programs in Canada and in many other countries as well. Callahan describes the stages through which belief in the value of science-based programs for the training of educational administrators developed in the United States:

> The superintendent as scholarly educational leader, 1865-1910.
>
> The superintendent as business manager or school executive, 1910-1930.
>
> The superintendent as statesman in a democratic school system, 1930-1954.
>
> The superintendent as applied social scientist, 1954-present.

Khleif (1975) has reported an illuminating study of the socializing process and values of an exemplary program for the training of an elite cadre of educational administrators in administrative science. He found that more of the effort of the program was devoted to the inculcation of values than it was to the training of students in science. Indeed, he found that under the guise of training in social science, the neophyte administrators were offered a new persona and introduced to a set of values congenial to prospective employers. Students were carefully chosen for the program and schooled at length in their roles. After an appropriate time, the neophytes were certified as experts in the social scientific knowledge needed to administer schools and were introduced to mentors who then recommended them for jobs in the power system of education. Thus, particular social values were advanced under the guise of a training program dedicated to science.

As Khleif (1975, 307) explains:

> The program is a high-speed course in social mobility.... The program is a school for statesmen or--if one is uncharitable--politicians. Candidates acquire an upper-middle class demeanor, dress, and presentability. Candidates become more socially polished, masters of small talk, alert politicians with--if necessary--a talent for intrigue and little arts of popularity. They become adept at self-manipulations and manipulations of others.

With respect to the values in the four historical stages identified by Callahan, Khleif says the science-based program

> puts an emphasis on the three latter types of superintendency and definitely discourages or

> ignores the first type. Attention to school finances, a smooth facade of democratic leadership and pieties about it, and a realistic training in the ways of community power exemplify the historical heritage and current culture of this profession.

It is not likely that training programs of the intensity and selectivity described by Khleif exist today. Such programs have been the victims of both a new stringency in university budgets and of a diminishing faith in the ideology that inspired them. But many programs of lesser purity and intensity undoubtedly remain, carrying on in the spirit noted by Khleif. Indeed, training programs for educational administrators have surely increased in number and enrolment over the past twenty years. They have consolidated their presence and have gained even stronger acceptance by sovereign powers. Such programs nurture Simon's conception of rational administration and decision-making. The pity of this situation is that such conceptions of administrative training block the development of programs that might deal more openly and helpfully with the value problems that confront all those who manage organizations. For administration is not a science in Simon's terms. It is better conceived as Hodgkinson (1978b, 100) does:

> While it has at its disposal a managerial quasi-technology, it is essentially a philosophical endeavour, a kind of humanism. Its overriding mission is the civilization of power.

The Alternative

The criticisms I have made of the conventional practice of administrative science can be summed up in a few brief points. First, administrative science does not work as science; it has not brought us increased understanding and control of organizations. Yet this outcome is what both early and contemporary proponents of the science of administration claim to be its whole justification. Administrative science was to provide useful and powerful knowledge. This was the very criterion by which the fledgling science of administration rejected all previous knowledge in the field. Second, administrative science has ignored power relationships and has been content to deal with administrative problems that ignore substantive problems in education. Third, administrative science has focused its efforts not upon the phenomenological realities of administration--upon the experience of wielding power and making decisions--but upon the organization. It has been content to regard organizations rather than people as the real actors in society. And finally, administrative science has de-valued the study of human choice and rationality. It has insisted that decision-making be dealt with *as though it were* fully explainable in rational and logical terms. This has allowed administrative science to deal with values surreptitiously, behind a mask of objectivity and impartiality, while denying it is doing so.

For these reasons, I believe it is a fair judgement to say that administrative science is in decline. Whether it has also fallen is a moot point. Some might argue that it does not matter whether the body of the science is dead or dying; it matters only that scholars and practitioners behave as though it were alive. Faith in administrative science certainly inspired the creation of the earliest models of science-based training programs (Khleif, 1975) and a similar, if somewhat diminished faith surely continues

to maintain them.

New directions are apparent in theory that again places value questions as central in administration (Hodgkinson, 1978b; Scott and Hart, 1979). What then is the alternative to a science- and fact-driven definition of the field? Though I have elaborated an answer elsewhere (Greenfield, 1983; 1985a), let me suggest again its dimensions.

1. Organizations are not things. They have no ontological reality, and there is no use studying them as though they did. They are an invented social reality of human creation. It is people who are responsible for organizations and people who change them. Organizations have reality only through human action and it is that action (and the human will driving it) that we must come to understand. The alternative I am proposing rejects theory that explains human behavior as though a depersonalized organization and its de-valued, nonhuman environment *caused* it. The alternative theory grants a measure of free will to individuals, and so places a measure of responsibility upon them for their action. People do not exist in organizations. Organizations exist in and through individuals. The concept of organization should be understood as a moral order deeply imbedded in each of us--an order that is arbitrary, nonnatural, and often backed by enormous power, even by violence. But that power may be redeemed by love, that is, by a dedication to better values.

2. Organizations are a nexus of freedom and compulsion. As invented social realities, they can not only be created but also manipulated. The creation and maintenance of this illusion is the root of what the world understands as leadership, although in less dramatic forms, it could as well be called administration. The metaphors of production and technical control, appropriate to systems, organisms, and other physical or biological unities, are not appropriate to understanding and administering organizations. We need new metaphors to describe organizations and administration. Perhaps most important would be to rid ourselves of the concept of an equilibriating system responding to benevolent environmental control. I suggest the metaphor of the Bonsai tree. This image is particularly apt for education. The gardener does not let the young tree simply "develop its full potential". Instead, he acts upon his own view of what constitutes a proper expression of the tree's potential, and he keeps clipping and pruning until the tree manifests that form. Since in education the "full potential" of a child (or of a teacher or administrator) could be anything from Charles Manson to Albert Schweitzer,[10] the gardener keeps pruning until the desired form is produced. The difference between the gardener's task and the task of the leader or administrator is that trees never learn. People do, and that is where organizations and human culture itself come from.

3. The world of will, intention, experience, and value is the world of organizations and administration. The building of a new science of administration will depend on our ability to

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[10]Near one end of this continuum, there surely stands Jim Keegstra, the small-town Alberta teacher who until recently taught and examined his students on a history whose central "facts" proved that Hitler's "final solution" was purely a hoax perpetrated by Jewish conspiracy.

understand these realities. It will require that we recognize their complexity (Hodgkinson, 1983, 57-91) and their personal and subjective dimensions (Greenfield, 1985a). Such a science will require methods and instruments that are adequate to these realities. As Schumacher (1977, 39-60) points out, the question of what constitutes adequate methods and instruments for understanding the world is essentially a philosophical one. And as Gronn (1982, 1984) has shown, our assumptions about adequate methods and instruments for studying administrators will not only reflect what we think administration is, but will also shape powerfully how we see administrators and understand what they do.

4. Conflict is endemic in organizations. It arises when different individuals or groups hold opposing values or when they must choose between accepted but incompatible values. Administrators represent values, but they also impose them. Administrative science must come to understand these complexities if it is to speak meaningfully to the world of practice. Only then may it begin to help administrators understand and cope with the personal and existential stress of conflict. The texts of administrative science are suffused with metaphors that portray organizations in terms of equilibrium, stability, adjustment, and harmony. We need other metaphors to bespeak the reality of stress and conflict.

5. The ideas and insights of Barnard (1938), the scholar-practitioner, were largely swept aside in the rush to make the study of administration embrace the rationality of Simon's science. What Barnard focused upon was not rationality and the enhancement of it, but an essential value phenomenon in organizations: commitment. For him, the building of commitment was the fundamental task of administration. This view raises the question, "How can administrators be moral?" rather than Simon's question, "How can they be rational?" Simon would make the administrator a technician; Barnard would have him be a moral leader. Barnard speaks of the moral complexity of the leader. If we return to Barnard's view, we need again his insights as well as new metaphors to ground the science of administration. To help us begin to think of leaders in moral terms, we should recognize that they are representatives of values: indeed, they are both creators of values and entrepreneurs for them.

6. The ethical dimensions of administration come constantly to the fore once we free ourselves from the metaphors of harmony, optimism, and rationality that administrative science imposes upon organizational reality. What amazes in all of this is to read the science-based texts and to mark how positive and optimistic they are about human nature and the human condition. Administrative science lives in a world of pristine goodness, and so its knowledge can be of little use to those who face the perplexities of the world--perplexities that come readily to those who do no more than reflect upon their own experience or who simply read the newspapers or literary portrayals of life in organizations. Those, like Hodgkinson, who observe life in organizations in a clear-eyed fashion find that things often go wrong in them; they are beset by conflict, self-interested action, and the debasement of value through compromise. He lets us see the power of commitment, the polestar quality of transcendent values, and the madness they may bring with them. He repeats Saul Bellow's simple but fundamental

question: "With everyone sold on the good, how does all the evil get done?" Of an earlier generation, Barnard speaks of the "moral complexity" of the leader by which he seems to mean the leader's wisdom in knowing when to raise moral issues and when to defuse them. Reflecting on such questions and building answers to them must become an essential and pervasive purpose of administrative studies. If Science cannot answer questions of what constitutes right action in social contexts--if it cannot speak of praxis--then it is time to begin again with a conception that sees administration as a set of existential and ethical issues. If inquiries launched from this premiss lead to an understanding of administration in moral terms, and if this knowledge helps administrators see themselves and their tasks more clearly and responsibly, we may then have reliable knowledge and a sound guide for action in the world. Although this is exactly the kind of knowledge that Simon found wanting and hoped to provide in a rational and control-oriented Science of Administration, could we not still call such knowledge "science" in humbler form?

An Agenda for the Future

Scholarship in administration has been bound for more than a generation by the power of Simon's thought. While a weakening of this remarkable uniformity is now apparent in all branches of the field, orthodoxy still struggles tenaciously to maintain its grip. In educational administration, defenders such as Willower (1985) meet the challenge by repeating positions only slightly modified from Simon's philosophical assumptions about the nature of administration and the proper means for inquiry into it. Most scholars will surely continue in the path that Simon pioneered, but others are now beginning to question that direction. They seek an alternative way and, therefore, an alternative conception of science to guide them. They, too, may call theirs the way of science, though they will likely abandon the assumptions and methods that Simon espoused as proper for scientific inquiry into administrative and organizational realities.

What is needed now in the study of educational administration is, first, the honesty to face the intellectual disarray of the field and, then, the courage to begin inquiry in a new mode. To guide such inquiry, we need only turn to an existing tradition of interpretive science that recognizes both subjectivity in the construction of social reality and the inevitability of interpretation in science. Though this mode of inquiry is still largely unknown and unused in administrative studies, it is at hand; it offers the best alternative to the narrow and increasingly sterile path of rationalism and positivistic science.

Administration is about power and powerful people. The study of administration must stand therefore upon a resolute examination of people as they strive to realize their ends. Administrative Science has too often yielded to the temptation of power and desired to wield it, not just to study it. Those who stand close to sovereign powers readily find reason to assist them. An adequate science of administration, however, must study power while resisting its pull. The new science of administration must be free to talk about the values that power serves, but free it cannot be if it is closely dependent upon the Sovereign (Ramos, 1981). To escape that dependency, the new science should abjure those

activities that are most likely to endear it to the Sovereign--recognizing that the Sovereign, like the Devil can take many forms. The certification of future administrators is one such endearing activity.

For more than a quarter of a century, a fact-driven model of decision-making and rationality has dominated training programs for educational administrators. To the extent that these programs embrace technically-oriented notions of administration, they offer less than they espouse. They miss the meaning of human action and most of what saves the study of administration from inducing a state of ennui in its students. They oversimplify administrative problems and overstate the claim that science can solve them. Yet such programs recognize virtually no limit on what can be done through academic study to prepare candidates for administrative responsibility. Only by suffering through their perhaps intentionally boring training do students of science-based training come to glimpse the meaning of administrative power and its scope for good and evil (Greenfield, 1980, 47-48).

A more fruitful training may be achieved through approaches that work with practising administrators and aim to give them deeper insights into the nature of their craft--into its dilemmas and possibilities--through study of its realities and through reflection upon them. We must seek new models for administrative training--ones that acknowledge responsibility, right judgement, and reflection as legitimately and inevitably part of administrative action. Such programs would lead the field of study toward what Scott (1985, 156) has called "revolutionary moral discourse" and away, therefore, from instruction in a putative science or organization and administration.

When I first took up the study of educational administration, nothing I learned cast a scintilla of doubt upon the certainty and power of administrative science; its objectivity and probity were simply assumed as were the benefits that were supposed to flow from its application. Certainly I did not doubt these apparent truths. What then is to be said now? Would the world be the worse without an administrative science? Probably not. But the issue is not simply science versus something else--versus the humanities, philosophy, or doing nothing at all. The issue is rather "What kind of science?" Toulmin (1983) has observed the progress of modern science and noted the transformation of the scientist from an observer of reality to a participant in its construction. Where scientists once worried only to do the measurement right, they now find an even greater problem: to do the right measurement--that is, to make the right observation. Thus the inevitability of subjective choice and interpretation enters science, and the possibility of a value-free science disappears. We must seek a new definition of science in administration--one that can accommodate the view that values pervade the entire realm of administration and, indeed, constitute the proper focus of study. Toulmin explains how a demand for neutrality in scientific method and observation came to limit the very kinds of problems that scientists could think of as proper for study:

> This demand for value neutrality played two separate roles in the sciences. On the one hand, it required the modern scientist to approach all the intellectual problems that properly fell within the scope of his methods with a clear head and a cool heart. On the other hand, it served to demarcate those issues that were properly the subjects for "scientific" investigation and discussion from those that were, rather, matters of human taste, choice, or decision. To begin with, these two aspects were not always distinguished in people's minds. (1981, 81)

If nothing else, we must understand that the new science of administration will be a science with values and of values.

What is required now is a transformation of the administrative scientist's attitudes toward the reality he studies. Scientists inspired by positivism approach administrators with the conviction that their theories and methods enable them to know administration in a way mere practitioners never could. The reverse assumption now seems a better point of departure: administrators know administration; scientists don't. The point of such inquiry would be to enable scientists to come to know what administrators know and to bring a fresh and questioning perspective to it. To accomplish this purpose, we might well return to one of Simon's original starting points and seek to understand the logic and psychology of human choice. But that will require the study of decisions, will, and intention in all their depth, perplexity, and subjective uncertainty. The new science will surely also require giving up the notion that decisions and organizations themselves can be controlled by science. Greater insight such science may offer, but greater control, no.

A possible research agenda of the new science is apparent:

1. How is the social reality of the organization built and maintained? What do administrators and others contribute to this process?

2. What is the role of language in the building of administrative reality? We might begin to answer this question by taking seriously Hodgkinson's propositions (1978b, 199-222): Two of these state, "Language is the basic administrative tool" and "Language *has* power and cloaks power."

3. The character of administrators is clearly of great importance. We may study it through biography and history.

4. Law is built upon the arbitration of value conflict. Let us emulate its methods and learn from the substance of its knowledge.

5. We must consider more fully such philosophical issues as the nature of value and the question of right values. What constitutes good or right in administrative affairs and how can administrators gain knowledge of it?

6. Questions of what constitutes good and right action in administration must be answered not simply for themselves, but in context and with specific educational issues and policies.

7. We must understand more deeply the administrative career. Who administers our schools? What motivates them to climb the ladder of administration? What happens to them as they do? What routes lead upward? In the recent past, there was truth in the dictum: women teach and men administer. What made that dictum true? Is there a better truth and how may it be realized? What are the consequences of these truths women and for men and how do they shape the organizations we understand as schools?

8. We need to understand the existential realities of leading and following in organizations. We need to understand the wielding of power and the making of decisions when much is on the line. And we need to appreciate what it is to suffer the decisions of such power.

This is a minimal agenda for research but it stands in contrast with much of what has gone before. If we could achieve it only partially, we would have some basis to say a valid and valuable science of administration is emerging.